Faced with aging populations and especially heightened fiscal constraints, large scale pension reforms were implemented in many affluent democracies during the 1990s. Canadian reforms, by contrast, were quite modest and old age security benefits emerged largely unscathed. Drawing on the comparative experience of other OECD nations, we highlight four characteristics of the Canadian pension system and the policy environment to account for this relative stability:(1) the comparatively modest scale of Canadian public sector pension expenditures; (2) relatively greater reliance on general revenue as opposed to payroll taxes to finance these expenditures; (3) the availability of other expenditure targets, notably health care, post-secondary education and social assistance, that could be cut with less political backlash; and (4) a pension design that allocates the public sector share disproportionately to the bottom end of the income distribution, precluding the emergence of the oppositional politics that fueled public debate elsewhere.
Since then, pension reform has emerged as a 'hot point' on the legislative agenda in three distinct periods. The period from mid-seventies to the early eighties brought the so-called Great Pension Debate, a high profile but ultimately doomed attempt to expand the modest second-tier earnings-related plan to European-like levels. The appropriate points of contrast here are the set of other 'latecomer' countries (Myles and Pierson 2001) , nations that by 1980 had no (Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand) or, like Canada, only modest (Denmark, Switzerland) second-tier earnings-related plans by 1980.
For all but New Zealand, the 1980s were a period of pension expansion, typically led by organized labour. In these cases, however, expansion took the form of mandatory, typically funded, employer plans. In Canada, mandatory employer pensions were viewed by the reformers as a second best, inferior, solution and were never aggressively pursued.
The result was no change.
Talk of expansion was quickly succeeded by the politics of retrenchment and can be divided into two periods: the first under the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney (1984 Mulroney ( -1993 and the second under Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (since 1993). In both periods, the universal flat benefit (Old Age Security) was targeted for reform with limited success. Here the appropriate points of contrast are Sweden and Finland. In both countries formerly universal flat rate pension benefits provided to all elderly citizens were 'clawed back' (to use the Canadian term) from high income earners by means of a 'pension test' (Myles and Quadagno 1997) . The Mulroney government succeeded in introducing an 'income test' for flat rate pensions in 1989 but as we show below its effects have been decidedly modest. A much more ambitious effort to scale back Old Age Security benefits from middle income seniors in the 1990s (see Battle 1997) , in contrast, did not get beyond the proposal stage.
Finally, amidst the usual rhetoric of 'unsustainability', the second tier earnings-related scheme (the Canada Pension Plan) was put on the reform agenda in the mid-nineties. The results were equally modest and served mainly to maintain the status quo. Contribution rates were raised to create a surplus to be invested in the equity markets with future revenues used to finance future benefits. This increase in 'advance funding' was aimed at maintaining benefit levels while smoothing out the effects of demographic change on contribution rates across successive cohorts of workers. The appropriate points of contrast here are the rather more draconian changes to second-tier earnings-related plans characteristic of many European countries since the early nineties.
In sum, against the comparative backdrop of the other affluent democracies, our main conclusion is that, on the benefit side, relatively little has changed to the basic pension design constructed in the fifties and sixties. Answering the question 'why not?', we contend, holds instructive lessons not only for understanding the Canadian case but also for making sense of larger scale reforms elsewhere. An obvious part of the answer is that 'size matters.' Like the other Anglo-Saxon countries, Canadian public sector pension expenditures are comparatively modest by international standards (about 5.5 per cent of GDP in the 1990s) and Canadian retirees receive a larger fraction (about 50 per cent) of their incomes from private occupational pensions, personal retirement accounts and other forms of savings. The upshot is that the potential contribution of pension cuts to other policy objectives such as deficit reduction was comparatively modest and, as we highlight in the discussion, governments found more tempting targets in other parts of the social policy matrix.
Less obvious, perhaps, is our claim that the financing mechanism -the composition of the tax budget used to finance public benefits -probably matters more. Unlike most countries that rely mainly on payroll taxes to finance old age pensions, Canada's pension budget is divided more or less evenly between payroll taxes and general revenue financing. High and rising payroll taxes, we argue, create strong incentives (and unusual coalitions) for reform that are comparatively weak in the Canadian context.
More tentatively, we make a claim about the 'moral economy' of reform. At the end of the day, all would-be reformers face the challenge of legitimating reforms with their publics by demonstrating that they correspond to some form of popularly held notions of justice or fairness. Many European reforms involved changes to benefit formulas that could readily be defended on the grounds that they involved elimination of inter-personal transfers (e.g. from private to public sector workers) that were indefensible. Large savings could be made by 'rationalizing redistribution' in public sector schemes (Myles and Pierson 2001) . In the U.S., the rhetoric of "intergenerational equity" was deployed in (still largely unsuccessful) efforts to cut Social Security. The claim was that scarce transfer dollars that could go to poor families with children were being allocated to relatively affluent, high income, retirees. The Canadian system disproportionately allocates the public sector share to the bottom end of the income distribution (Myles 2000) , providing precious little room for such a rhetoric to take hold (Cook et al. 1994 ).
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, successive Canadian governments found other targets for reform in their pursuit of deficit and debt reduction. During the golden age of expansion, political parties were eager to claim credit for new programs.
Retrenchment, in contrast, is generally an exercise in blame avoidance rather than credit claiming (Weaver 1986 ). Health care, post-secondary education and social assistance provided targets amenable to cost cutting without the associated political backlash likely to follow from significant reductions in pension expenditures. The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) was established in 1967 as the second component of the pension system's first tier (Bryden, 1974: 130-137; Guest, 1997: 144-145 From the outset both the CPP and QPP relied on partial funding as a result of the surplus of contributions built up in the early years of the plans. Importantly, however, assets from the QPP trust fund were invested in equities and real estate, to support provincial economic growth and French Canadian entrepreneurship (Thomson 1984) while CPP surpluses were lent to the provinces at preferred rates to subsidize provincial debt. This difference was a direct outcome of the 1960s Quiet Revolution, an attempt to modernize 4 Benefits from either scheme are based on pension credits accumulated under both, as if only one scheme existed. On the federal/provincial bargaining process leading to the enactment of the C/QPP, see Simeon, 1972 and Bryden, 1974: 129-182. Quebec society and to improve the socio-economic status of the province's Frenchspeaking majority.
The third tier of the Canadian pension system was actually the first to emerge. (Maser and Dufour 2001, p. 14) . While coverage by these personal retirement accounts is exceptionally high by international standards (OECD, 2001 ), the bulk of RRSP assets are held by middle and upper income workers.
From the 'Great Pension Debate' to the politics of retrenchment
The earliest stage of the current Canadian politics of pension reform can be found in the so-called 'Great Pension Debate' of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The debate was launched in 1975 when the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) advanced a proposal to double C/QPP benefits and contributions. At the time, there was a general consensus concerning the need to increase benefits targeted at low-income elderly (especially elderly women). But the main issue at stake was over the use of the public pension system to ameliorate income security in light of tepid growth in private sector coverage.
While labour unions, women's rights groups and social reform lobbies clearly supported a widespread expansion of the C/QPP to meet the needs of Canadian workers, voices within the Canadian business community opposed an increase in payroll contribution rates. From their perspective, the solution to income security problems lay in the growth of private pensions. Moreover, provincial leaders, especially those from Ontario and Quebec, could not agree on the suitable course of reform (Banting 1987) . Because the C/QPP had many qualities lacking in private pension plans (indexing, portability, low 7 RRIFs are tax-deferred investments offered as payout options from RRSPs. 8 In that province, the Conservative Party was in power from 1943 to 1985.
administrative costs, universal coverage of the labour force), a federal report published in 1980 favoured the public sector option supported by left-wing groups and Quebec's political leaders (Task Force on Retirement Income Policy 1980). The inability of the business sector to reach consensus on a private sector solution also contributed to the ideological success of the public solution. While large firms were willing to accept mandatory private pensions to put an end to the coverage problem, small businesses opposed this option (Myles 1988, p. 46 ).
In addition to business opposition, proponents of the public sector solution faced the de facto 'veto power' of Ontario, Canada's largest province. Because the federal and provincial governments share constitutional responsibility for this program, Ottawa must reach an agreement with at least two-thirds of the provinces representing two-thirds of the Canadian population before enacting a reform (Battle 1997, p. 538) . During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the pro-business conservative government of Ontario, by far the most populous Canadian province, opposed any attempt to significantly expand the C/QPP. 8 The institutional structure of Canadian federalism at the origin of provincial 'veto power' -combined with the opposition of the business sector -was instrumental in the defeat of left-wing forces supporting a public solution to the 'pension problem' (Banting 1987, pp. 62-69) . As we shall see, however, the same constitutional obstacle was a key element restraining serious consideration of cutbacks in the following decade.
Despite the many and voluminous reports on the topic, the reform movement began to wither with the onset of recession in 1982.
It is instructive to compare Canada's experience in the 1980s with that of the 'latecomer' countries (Myles and Pierson 2001) , nations that had no (Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand) or, like Canada, only modest (Denmark, Switzerland)
second-tier earnings-related plans by 1980. For all but New Zealand, the 1980s were a period of pension expansion, typically led by organized labour leading to the establishment of mandatory (or quasi-mandatory) employer plans. From the outset, however, Canadian labour and its allies in the reform project rejected this strategy and the result was no change.
The failed assault on 'universality'
The economic recession of 1982 dissipated these reform forces while contributing to a gradual transformation of the Canadian policy agenda. Rising unemployment and a decline in economic activity increased social spending and expanded the federal deficit. became a national symbol of the conflict between 'greedy politicians' and the 'deprived elderly', and in this instance the politicians backed down. While this episode was then perceived as proof of the emerging power of a powerful 'grey lobby' in Canada, the 1985 debate appears more as an exception than as a new 'iron rule' of Canadian politics (Battle 1997, p. 530) . Far less vocal and well organized than its US counterpart, the Canadian 'grey lobby' has never played a truly central role in pension politics since that time.
12 11 According to the plan, OAS benefits would only increase by the amount that inflation surpasses 3 per cent. 'If inflation were 3% or higher a year, then OAS benefits would automatically loose 3% of their value. Even if inflation were less than 3%, benefits would decline by the amount of inflation (e.g. an inflation rate of 2% would reduce the value of OAS by 2%).' (Battle, 1997: 530-531) 12 For a comparative outlook on the Canadian grey lobby, see Pratt, 1997 . However, the cut-off point ($51 765) where the clawback would come into effect was only indexed to inflation in excess of 3 per cent so that in real terms a growing share of seniors could be affected with the passage of time. Since the huge majority of the elderly were unaffected and few politicians or journalists understood the longer-term implications of the reform, the clawback came to be identified as 'social policy by stealth' (Battle 1990 ).
Low inflation and slow income growth during the 1990s, however, meant that by 2001, less than 5 per cent of all seniors were affected by the income test introduced in 1989. In 2000, full indexation was restored with the result that future savings from the 13 In the Canadian parliamentary system, the strong centralization of power creates a high level of autonomy that could exacerbate political risks related to pension reform (Pierson and Weaver, 1993) clawback will only occur as a result of a significant increase in the numbers of very highincome retirees.
The rise and fall of Seniors Benefits
After some reluctance, the Liberals moved forward on pension reform in 1995. With the 'war on the deficit' and demographic fears as a background, the 1995 Budget formulated five principles for the reform of public pensions (1995 Budget cited in Battle 1997, p.
539):
1. undiminished protection for less well-off seniors;
2. continued full indexation to protect seniors from inflation;
3. provision of OAS benefits on the basis of family income;
4. greater progressivity of benefits by income level; and 5. control of program costs.
Far from departing from the Conservative agenda, these design criteria reinforced the logic of pension reform that emerged during the second half of the 1980s, the effective abolition of universal flat rate pensions. 15 The same strategy has been used in the US concerning the gradual change in retirement age enacted as part of the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act (Light, 1995) .
Targeting was still highly controversial in 1995, but the Liberals made sure to avoid the mistake of the first Mulroney government, which was to call into question full indexation of benefits. The spectre of Solange Denis's colourful encounter with Brian Mulroney was a source of 'political learning' for elected politicians interested in reducing political risks related to pension reform (Caragata 1995) .
In 1996 Considering that the Bloc Québécois and most social reform organizations also rejected the Seniors Benefit, political support for this measure appeared weak.
Facing considerable pressure from social movements, the Retirement Income
Coalition and opposition parties, the liberal government finally withdrew the controversial reform proposal, more than two years before it was to take effect. Referring to renewed economic prosperity and a shrinking federal deficit, Finance Minister Paul
Martin found an elegant way to justify his retreat:
The reform of the OAS/GIS was launched at a time when our choices were restricted by the overwhelming constraint of a $38 billion deficit and, as importantly, a debt-to-GDP ratio that had risen virtually uninterrupted since the mid-1970s. Because of these two very real fiscal factors, the proposal made in 1995 represented the best choice available at the time. That being said, any choice that depended on taking money out of the retirement income system was far from ideal. Three years later, our prospects have changed for the better and a much wider set of choices is now available. (Martin 1998) Now that the federal government was expecting long-term fiscal surpluses, the idea that future retirees had to make significant economic sacrifices in the name of fiscal austerity was difficult to justify.
The fall of the Seniors Benefit proposal is related to a strategic mistake of the liberal government. Instead of relying on hidden fiscal changes that silently affect wealthier beneficiaries, Paul Martin launched a highly visible reform project that attracted too much attention to neutralize the political risks associated with the politics of retrenchment. Despite their decision to postpone the implementation of the Seniors Benefit and their commitment to indexation and social redistribution, the proposal attracted widespread media attention to a reform project that upset key interest groups and a significant fraction of the population. Moreover, unpopular budget cuts enacted between 1995 and 1997 in other policy areas such as unemployment insurance and fiscal transfers to provincial governments reduced the political 'security margin' of the government in the field of pension retrenchment. 16 Hence, while OAS became a target for reform under two political regimes, at the end of the day little was changed.
The politics of consultation: reforming the Canada Pension Plan
In 1995, the publication of the Fiftieth Actuarial Report of the CPP suddenly pushed this program to the centre of the Canadian policy agenda. Due to a significant increase in disability benefits and the impact of the economic recession, this report projected a higher schedule for future contributions than anticipated by the previous actuarial report.
Without a significant change in the current schedule of contribution rates, by the year 2015, the CPP would no longer collect enough revenues to pay all the benefits (Battle 1997, p. 537) .
17
While the Reform Party and conservative think tanks such as the CD Howe
Institute responded with proposals to replace the public pay-as-you-go system with private sector alternatives, the governing Liberals launched a consultative process aimed at reforming the program in an incremental manner. This consultative turn in pension reform is related to a key institutional feature of the CPP noted earlier: since the federal and provincial governments share constitutional responsibility for this program, Ottawa must reach an agreement with at least two-thirds of the provinces with two-thirds of the population before enacting a reform (Battle 1997, p. 538) . 16 On these related retrenchment efforts, see Banting, 1997; Rice and Prince, 2000: 110-129. 17 Between 1966 and 1986, a contribution rate of only 3.6 per cent prevailed. In 1993, such a rate had risen to 5 per cent (Emery and Rongve, 1999: 69) . 4. The CPP must be affordable and sustainable for future generations. This requires fuller funding and a contribution rate no higher than the already legislated future rate of 10.1 per cent. In deciding how quickly to move to this rate, governments must take economic and fiscal impacts into account.
8. CPP funds must be invested in the best interests of plan members, and maintain a proper balance between returns and investment risk. Governance structures must be created to ensure sound fund management (Government of Canada, 1996c) .
While the first of these principles reflects a strong emphasis on 'economic competitiveness', the second one is the product of a policy learning process related to the 18 During the first half of the 1980s, however, the Caisse de dépôt et placement faced criticism and suspicion from the business community and the federal government, which considered this investment board as a mere political tool of nationalism (Brooks and Tanguay, 1985) . More recently, authors such as Pierre Arbour have criticized what they considered as the excessive 'economic power' of the Caisse (Arbour, 1993; . 19 The government of Quebec enacted the same schedule of contribution increases to harmonize them with the federal one.
Finally enacted in January 1998, Bill C-2 included other minor modifications aimed at improving the long-term financial situation of the CPP. For example, the annual basic exemption was frozen at $3500 so that the portion of income subject to contributions will increase faster than inflation (Government of Canada 1997). Moreover, 'retirement pensions will be calculated on the 5-year average of the Year's Maximum Pensionable
Earnings at the time, instead of the 3-year average.' (Martin, Paul 1997 ) Disability pensions were also subject to some cost-control measures. To boost public confidence in the program, contributors will receive annual reports on their CPP accounts and the federal-provincial reviews will be conducted every three years, rather than five years. Far from radically breaking from the historical path of the program, the 1997 reform reaffirmed the contributory nature of the C/QPP. Moreover, significant (and unpopular) reforms such as an increase in retirement age were excluded from the reformers' agenda.
It is worth mentioning that the privatisation of the CPP has never been considered as a serious option by Canadian policy-makers. Despite the rhetoric emanating from the conservative Canadian Alliance party and Alberta's Conservative party (for example:
Martin 1995), pressures to move from social insurance to individual savings accounts are far more diffuse in Canada than in the United States. Despite that fact that neo-liberal economists and politicians have exploited the demographic fears associated with population ageing, public support for the CPP remains strong (Townson 2001, p. 195 ).
The 1998 CPP reform reduced these fears by improving the system's financial balance and recent stock market instability (especially in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks) has been detrimental to the emergence of a large movement favouring pension privatisation (Chevreau 2002) .
Beyond this relative lack of support for privatisation, federal policies enacted during the 1980s favoured greater reliance on personal savings and private pension schemes. Conservative, as well as Liberal governments, significantly increased the level of tax assistance during the 1980s and 1990s to provide greater incentives for Canadians to save money for their retirement (Battle 1997, p. 525) . These reforms concerned both RRSPs and RPPs. Moreover, 'tax assistance limits were made fairer and more flexible.' (Pearse 2001, p. 214) In spite of these reforms, only 39. represents the main source of economic support for low-income elderly and has brought old age poverty to now very low levels (Myles 2000) . While some scholars have argued that even minor erosion of universality would affect the political support for statefinanced pensions, it seems that the OAS and GIS programs have a strong political basis in Canadian society.
Discussion
Although the window of retrenchment was opened on several occasions in the past two decades, the design put in place in the 1950s and 1960s has thus far survived relatively On blame avoidance, see Weaver, 1986. block grant to the provinces to finance these programs. Although Ottawa established basic ground rules for their delivery, the final mix of services and benefits in all three areas remained under provincial jurisdiction (Rice and Prince 2000) .
Divided jurisdiction with regard to both the CAP (social assistance) and EPF (health and post-secondary education) proved to be a mixed blessing for Ottawa. As these programs were expanding, Ottawa received little political credit since the services and benefits they provided were delivered under provincial brand names. In a period of retrenchment, however, Ottawa was able to retreat from all three areas by cutting transfers to the provinces, leaving provincial governments to take the blame, for subsequent reductions in services and benefits. In 1995, The Liberals dismantled both the CAP and EPF, replacing them with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) leading to 'savings' of 8.5 and 15.2 percent (or about $7 billion) in the first two years of its existence (Battle 1998, p. 330 ).
In contrast, OAS and GIS are purely federal programs and, in the case of the CPP, Third Wayism assigns responsibility for "nurturing capitalism" (Battle 2001 ) to welfare states. During the 1990s, the major targets for Canadian Third Way reforms were unemployment insurance and child benefits. In the case of the former, changes in eligibility rules greatly reduced coverage rates among the unemployed. In contrast, income-tested child benefits for the 'working poor' were greatly expanded to enhance work incentives, a path also followed in the U.K. and the U.S.
Pension policy and population aging get on the radar screen of Third Way advocates when they are widely perceived to be reducing employment levels either by encouraging early retirement or by driving up payroll taxes. Neither feature has figured prominently in Canadian policy debates.
Because of its modest scale, changes to the age of eligibility for CPP pensions are unlikely to have large effects on retirement behaviour except among lower income earners, creating obvious equity problems. Such a result would be perverse for macroeconomic as well as for distributive reasons. The largest gains to the economy are to be had if the most productive workers (the healthy, well educated, and presumably better paid) remain in employment longer. Reform can have a potentially perverse effect if changes to retirement incentives in public sector plans mainly produce higher retirement ages among low wage, low productivity workers.
To induce large changes in retirement ages among middle and upper income wageearners in the Canadian context would require extensive regulation of the age at which workers can access private sources of retirement wealth (RPPs, RSSPs), on the one hand, and, on the other, reforms that eliminate incentives that now bias retirement decisions in favour of more retirement and less employment. Early retirement incentives and defined benefit formulae that discourage continued employment are examples. But until now, there has been precious little pressure on Canadian policy-makers to pursue such an agenda and little likelihood of reaching the political consensus required for reform if they did. Current and projected ratios of retirees to workers while higher in Canada than in the U.S. are well below typical European levels (OECD, 2001, p. 79).
The major pressure for pension reform in OECD countries is a product of high and rising payroll taxes to meet current and future pension expenditures. The payroll tax is a flat tax, often with a wage ceiling that makes it regressive. Unlike income taxes, there are no exemptions and no allowances for family size. Low-wage workers and especially younger families with children typically bear a disproportionate share of the cost as a result. These effects are compounded to the extent that high payroll taxes discourage employment, especially at the lower end of the labour market where the social safety net, minimum wages, or industrial relations systems make it difficult for employers to pass such costs on to employees.
Because of their impact on wage costs (for employers) and the real take-home pay of less skilled and younger workers, the threat of high and rising payroll taxes has provided a potent incentive for the formation of somewhat unexpected coalitions of business and labour favouring pension reform in many countries (Myles and Pierson 2000) . Since lowwage workers and especially younger families with children typically bear a disproportionate share of the cost, union leaders really do face a trade-off between their retired and working-age constituents if, as projected in Germany for example, payroll taxes were to rise from 22 to 38 percent of payroll in the coming decades.
By European and even U.S. standards, however, current and future payroll tax levels for pensions in Canada are quite modest, reflecting the modest scale of the C/QPP, one the one hand, and on the other greater reliance on general revenue financing (for OAS/GIS). In the mid-nineties, prior to reform, the payroll contribution rate for CPP was 5.6 per cent (compared to 12.4 per cent in the U.S.) and was projected to peak at 14.2 per cent in the next century, a level already exceeded by most European countries. The 1997 CPP reform accelerated contribution rates early in to create a capital pool the revenues from which will be used to finance future benefits. The aim was to reduce future increases. After reform, the maximum projected rate for future wage-earners is a modest 9.8 per cent.
The Moral Economy of Pension Reform
During the 1980s and 1990s, a remarkable shift in policy debate occurred in a number of countries. Whereas in the 1960s the common assumption in old age policy debates was that the elderly were 'too poor,' by the 1980s the claim that the elderly were 'too rich' was heard with growing frequency. In the United States, the rapid fall of poverty rates among the elderly relative to children brought themes of 'intergenerational equity' to the fore (Preston 1984) together with charges against the elderly of being 'greedy geezers.'
Although 'population aging' is often perceived through the pessimistic lens of 'apocalyptic demography' (Prince 2000) , the issue of 'intergenerational equity' has been far less prominent in Canada than in the United States (Marmor et al. 1994) . This difference, we think, has a real material base.
As elsewhere, average incomes among Canadian seniors did rise sharply from the 1970s to the 1990s and low-income rates among Canadian seniors measured by the usual international standard (persons with adjusted incomes less than 50 per cent of the median) are among the lowest in the OECD, even when compared to egalitarian Sweden (Hauser 1997; Smeeding & Sullivan 1998) . 21 But it was difficult to make the claim that the elderly were becoming 'too rich' (Table 1) . In 1980, about 40 per cent of all elderly persons were in the bottom quintile, twice the rate for the population as a whole. By 1995, just over 17 per cent of the elderly were in the bottom quintile, somewhat below the level of 20 per cent for the entire population. However, approximately 80 per cent of the shift out of the bottom quintile reflected movement into the second and third quintiles and little increase in the proportion of seniors in the top two quintiles. While the risk of poverty fell dramatically over the period, it was difficult to sustain the case that retirees were becoming 'too rich'. The reason for this outcome is that in combination OAS/GIS, the C/QPP and related transfers function much like an enriched flat benefit system on a pre-tax basis and post-21 By the usual international standard, low-income rates among Canadian seniors had fallen to about 5 per cent in 1994 compared to a U.S. rate in excess of 20 per cent. And among the population 70+, Canada's low-income rate was below that of Sweden, the usual 'winner' in the international league tables on poverty reduction (Smeeding & Sullivan, 1998). tax the overall impact is highly redistributive. This result is highlighted in Table 2 where we show average (equivalence adjusted) income transfers from all public plans by source and age-specific income quintiles for the population 65+ in 1995. 22 Total pre-tax transfers (column 5) of between eleven and twelve thousand dollars or approximately 50 percent of the average equivalence adjusted disposable income ($23 000) of all persons 65+ is more or less identical across all income levels.
Conclusion
Since early eighties, the universal flat benefit (Old Age Security) system was targeted for reform on two occasions but with limited success while the 1997 CPP reform served primarily to maintain the status quo. In order to understand why Canadian policy-makers enacted reforms that seem so modest from a comparative perspective, we showed that an essential part of the answer is that 'size matters'. Because of the modest level of pensionrelated public expenditures in Canada, the potential contribution of pension cuts to deficit reduction was comparatively limited. In this context, both Liberal and Conservative governments found more attractive targets in other areas of state intervention, especially those areas in which the federal government could transfer political risks to provincial leaders. As importantly, limited reliance on payroll taxes to finance the public system created few incentives for the emergence of the reform coalitions that have been 22 All incomes are adjusted with an equivalence scale to take account of differences in family size. 
